


LECTURE 7: CHAPTER 4: THE RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM ①

FROM STILLWELL'S ELEMENTS OF NUMBER THEORY

NEEDED MATHEMATICAL INGREDIENTS

- ✓ inverses modulo n , Euler theorem: $a^{\varphi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$
- ✓ algorithm to calculate binary rep. of $\#$
- ✓ Euclidean algorithm which gives inv of $a \pmod{b}$

RSA, preliminary sketch



§4.1: TRAP DOOR FUNCTIONS: (a bit on CRYPTOGRAPHY IN GENERAL)

Example: THE CAESAR CIPHER:

Take message $ABCDE \dots Z \rightarrow 12345 \dots 26$
 then shift by adding $k \pmod{26}$ so

$$ABCDE \dots Z \mapsto A+k, B+k, \dots, 26+k \pmod{26}$$

For example, $k=3$,

$$ABCDE \dots Z \mapsto 45678 \dots 3 \leftrightarrow DEF \dots C$$

So in this code ($k=3$ case)

$$\begin{aligned} A &\mapsto D \\ B &\mapsto E \\ &\vdots \\ Z &\mapsto C \end{aligned}$$

Remark: we ignore important issues such as how to parse words. Clearly this matters for real messages!

As Stillwell says "Go to Zagreb tomorrow"
 \mapsto "Jr wr Cdjuh wrprur z"

Example 2: THE ONE-TIME PAD

Key: long sequence of #'s in $\mathbb{N}_{26} = \{1, 2, \dots, 26\}$
 The digit x_i is added to i^{th} letter in message
 then receiver must subtract x_i from i^{th} letter.
 Once key is used then it's "torn off the pad"
 and x_{n+1}, x_{n+2}, \dots is used for next message.

Comment: both encryptor and decryptor need this
huge key to make this work. However, once
 both possess it, this is nearly perfect security.
 In contrast, the Caesar cipher is way easier
 to put into practice, but far less secure.

COMPROMISE CIRCA 1970: the trapdoor functions. Basically,
 a trapdoor function is easy to do, but hard to undo.
 As Stillwell mentions: - like falling through trapdoor
 - like scrabbling eggs.
 Well, there's more, a trapdoor function is easy to undo
 with the help of a "key"

- 1976 • idea of trapdoor fncs: Diffie and Hellman
 - 1978 • RSA method: Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
 - 1970's • Clifford Cochr (British Intelligence)
- Existence of Key debated

What is the trapdoor?

Take primes which are big say P_1 and P_2 and multiply them $(P_1, P_2) \mapsto n = P_1 P_2$. Now, given n find (P_1, P_2) . Much harder,

$$n = f(P_1, P_2) = P_1 P_2$$

polynomial time
 $\sim n^2$ steps for
pair of n -digit #

vs

$$f^{-1}(n) = (P_1, P_2)$$

$\sim 10^n$ steps. To factor $2n$ -digit # basically have to divide n by the 10^n #'s with $\leq n$ digits

$$\underline{n=6} \quad 36$$

vs.

$$10^6 = 1,000,000$$

$$\underline{n=9} \quad 81$$

vs.

$$10^9 = 1,000,000,000$$

etc...

CAUSE FOR CAUTION: 1994, SHOR showed a

QUANTUM COMPUTER could FACTOR IN POLYNOMIAL TIME! This result casts a shadow on all the NP (non-polynomial) problems... perhaps a quantum computer will solve them in reasonable time, but, no feasible quantum computer constructed (YET...)

§ 4.2 INGREDIENTS OF RSA

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To use RSA, one "owns" a pair of large prime, say P_1, P_2 of 100-digits $\Rightarrow P_1, P_2$ takes about 100^2 -steps to calculate, but $n = P_1 P_2$ would take 10^{100} -steps to factor! It follows you can safely share $n = P_1 P_2$ w/o revealing P_1, P_2 .

Th^m / Let P_1, P_2 be prime then $\varphi(P_1 P_2) = (P_1 - 1)(P_2 - 1)$

Proof: $\varphi(P_1 P_2) = \#$ of natural #'s relatively prime to $P_1 P_2$ and smaller than $P_1 P_2$. Of course $\varphi(P_1) = P_1 - 1$ and $\varphi(P_2) = P_2 - 1$.

We need to count $a \in \mathbb{N}$ s.t. $\gcd(a, P_1 P_2) = 1$.

Or, count the $a \in \mathbb{N}$ for which $\gcd(a, P_1 P_2) \neq 1$

for example, $P_1, 2P_1, 3P_1, \dots, (P_2 - 1)P_1 < P_1 P_2$ *

and $P_2, 2P_2, 3P_2, \dots, (P_1 - 1)P_2 < P_1 P_2$. Stillwell

claims these are the only exceptions to $\gcd(a, P_1 P_2) = 1$.

If $\gcd(a, P_1 P_2) = c \Rightarrow \cancel{\varphi(P_1 P_2)} \neq \varphi(P_1 P_2)$
 $\Rightarrow c | a$ and $c | P_1 P_2$
 $\Rightarrow c | a$ and $c | P_1$ or $c | P_2$

Hence Stillwell's claim correct by Prime divisor property.

Thus, the # of relatively prime # $< P_1 P_2$ to $P_1 P_2$ are

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi(P_1 P_2) &= P_1 P_2 - (P_2 - 1) - (P_1 - 1) - 1 \\ &= P_1 P_2 - P_1 - P_2 + 1 \\ &= (P_1 - 1)(P_2 - 1). //\end{aligned}$$

← don't include $P_1 P_2$ itself start with $P_1 P_2 - 1$ then remove * and *

$$\boxed{\text{Th } \phi(p_1, p_2) = \phi(p_1)\phi(p_2) = (p_1 - 1)(p_2 - 1)}$$

← multiplicative property of Euler ϕ -function.

Application: If we know p_1 and p_2 (primes) then we can easily compute $n = p_1 p_2$ and $\phi(n) = (p_1 - 1)(p_2 - 1)$.

Also, choose encryption exponent e with $\text{gcd}(e, \phi(n)) = 1$. This e and n are made public so anyone can send encrypted messages to the user who knows p_1, p_2 (separately). Notice, once you encrypt M you can't undo it (unless you also know p_1, p_2 , which you can't know with just $n = p_1 p_2$.)

From $\phi(n)$ the user (with p_1, p_2) is able to compute a decryption exponent d which is inverse to $e \pmod{\phi(n)}$.

Recall, by Euclidean Alg, $\text{gcd}(e, \phi(n)) = 1 \Rightarrow \exists m_1, m_2$ s.t. $m_1 e + m_2 \phi(n) = 1 \Rightarrow [e]^{-1} = [m_1]$ w.r.t modulus $\phi(n)$.

§4.3 Exponentiation mod n

$$m^k = \underbrace{m \cdot m \cdot \dots \cdot m}_{k \text{ factors}}$$

→ $(k-1)$ -multiplications of 100 digit #'s = \textcircled{i}

But, can use binary form of k to guide slick exponentiation by successive squaring

Ex) $m^{65} \Rightarrow m^4 \cdot m = (m^2)^2 \cdot m = m$ ($65/2 = (2^6 + 1)/2 = 1000001$)

$m \xrightarrow{2} m^2 \xrightarrow{2} m^4 \xrightarrow{2} m^8 \xrightarrow{2} m^{16} \xrightarrow{2} m^{32} \xrightarrow{2} m^{64} \xrightarrow{m} m^{65}$

number of operations $\sim 2 \#$ of binary digits in $k \sim \log_2(k) + 1$. Still too huge w/o reduction... this is where $\text{mod}(n)$ comes into play

Ok, so, to recap, we take message m and exponentiate via k by successive squaring with a few multiplications. For 100-digit primes $\Rightarrow m^k$ takes about 200 operations. If we do these modulo n then we have about n^2 -steps per op. $\hookrightarrow 200 \cdot n^2$ total steps.

§4.4 RSA encryption and decryption

- 1 \triangleright user's primes P_1, P_2 whose product $n = P_1 P_2$ is huge.
- 2 \triangleright $m \in \mathbb{N}$ codes some message by simple transcription and $m < n$ as to not lose info mod n .
(otherwise have to chop the message into smaller parts to encrypt w.r.t. key n .)

3 \triangleright $m \mapsto m^e \pmod{n}$ where $\gcd(e, n) = 1$. he said $\phi(n)$ on p. 70

4 \triangleright $m^e \mapsto (m^e)^d \pmod{n}$ maybe this is typo on 72.
 $ed + c_1 \phi(n) = 1$
 $\hookrightarrow ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$

$(m^e)^d = m^{1 + c_1 \phi(n)} = m (m^{\phi(n)})^{c_1} = m$ by Euler's Th^m
 $m^{\phi(n)} \equiv m \pmod{n}$.

§4.5 Digital Signatures

- pick common message m (say Psalm 23 etc.)
- encrypt by key n and exponent e
- await user to decrypt m and send back
- [if user can uncover m then this proves they are the genuine owner of the key n with exp. e .]-

THE BINARY EXPONENTIATION TRICK

$$\underline{\underline{m^{49}}}$$

$$49 = 32 + 16 + 1$$

$$(49)_2 = 110001$$

① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥

$$1 \xrightarrow{\text{①}} m \xrightarrow{\text{②}} m^2 \xrightarrow{\text{③}} m^4 \xrightarrow{\text{④}} m^8 \xrightarrow{\text{⑤}} m^{16} \xrightarrow{\text{⑥}} m^{32} \xrightarrow{\text{⑦}} m^{48} \xrightarrow{\text{⑧}} m^{49}$$

↑
start with 1, of course could start with m^2 and go from ②...

↑
last step no square after m multiplication

Goal: $5^{49} \pmod{221}$: follow ①, ②, ..., ⑥ above.

$$5 \xrightarrow{\text{①}} 5^2 \xrightarrow{\text{②}} 125 \xrightarrow{\text{③}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} (125)^2 &= 5^6 \\ (-96)^2 &= 5^6 \\ \hline 155 &= 5^6 \\ \Rightarrow 5^6 &= -66 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} 5^{12} &= (-66)^2 \\ &= 4356 \\ &= 157 \pmod{221} \\ &= -64 \end{aligned}$$

- divide by 221
- subtract off whole # part
- multiply by 221 to find remainder.

$$\xrightarrow{\text{④}} 5^{24} = (-64)^2 \pmod{221} = 118 \xrightarrow{\text{⑤}} 5^{48} = (118)^2 \pmod{221} = 1 \xrightarrow{\text{⑥}} 5^{49} = 5(1) = 5$$

↑
so annoying!